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Trust, Self-Interest,

Rhode

and Representation
in Economic

Reconsidered

Island

Policymaking:

Thomas

J.

Anton and Darrell M. West

Industrial policy has become an increasingly central focus of political debate as
American society struggles with new and troubling economic realities. Yet despite the
importance of this subject, little is known about how the public gains or processes
information on these matters, or about the evaluative standards used to judge
industrial-policy proposals. A recent referendum in Rhode Island offered a unique

opportunity to study these questions. Citizens participated directly in the debate over

new

industrial policy by soundly rejecting the

comprehensive plan

to "reindustrialize"

Greenhouse Compact, a novel and

Rhode

Here we report the

Island.

results

of a

public opinion survey conducted shortly after that referendum. We show that Rhode
Islanders rejected the

Compact not because

they felt the government

had no

legitimate

economic development, but because of uncertainty over the particular plan on
the ballot and dissatisfaction with the manner in which Greenhouse advocates
role in

presented their plan to the public.

American

state

and local governments since 1980 have adopted an extraordinary

number of new economic development

policies, ranging

from assistance with

product marketing to the provision of venture capital. Most of these innovations have
1

been promoted by politicians and

Rhode

with

officials,

Island, however, officials insisted

little

input

from ordinary

on obtaining public approval

for

citizens. In

an ambitious

economic development plan called the Greenhouse Compact. Put before the voters on
June

12, 1984, the

plan was defeated by an overwhelming four-to-one margin. Not sur-

prisingly,

many commentators have attempted

rejection.

Perhaps the most prominent analysis has been provided by Ira Magaziner,

to

account for

this

unexpectedly decisive

himself the major author of the Greenhouse proposal. Magaziner suggests a variety of
factors that contributed to the

referendum defeat but lays particular emphasis on voters'

lack of trust in the process that produced this ambitious plan. "All the analysts of poll
data," he writes, "all the

postmortem discussions, and

all

paign' indicate that for most voters, the decision about the

the experiences of the 'cam-

Greenhouse Compact

ulti-

mately revolved around the issue of trust." 2

Thomas J. Anton is director of the A. Alfred Taubman Center for Public Policy and American
and Darrel M. West is assistant professor of political science, at Brown University.
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we

In this article,
1,001

Rhode

test

Magaziner's assertion, using data derived from a survey of

Island citizens which

was conducted immediately

Because our survey explored both the

and the changing context within which those

criteria

examine the conceptual underpinnings of "trust"

compare the significance of the

trust issue

in

detail.

campaign aggravated

little

itself

voters.

from

to gain

to

were also able

to

trust

was assuredly an

and the dynamics of the campaign

The substance
its

of the plan

made

approval, and the dynamics of the

were not well enough represented on a

citizens' fears that they

commission dominated by the

We

with other plausible explanations of the

important issue, both the substance of the plan

were powerful influences on Rhode Island

referendum.

were applied, we were able

some

referendum outcome. Our analysis will suggest that while

clear that the average voter had

after the

used by citizens to evaluate the proposal

criteria

state's elite.

Studying Economic Development Referenda

The

on tax and candidate elections suggests three broad classes of explana-

literature

tions that

may

help account for voter reactions to the Greenhouse Compact. The

first

economic well-being determine voter choices. According to economic models, voters who perceive that the costs imposed on them by a given proposal
is

that calculations of

will

be greater than the benefits they are likely

who

believe that the costs are less than the benefits will vote in favor of the proposal.

to receive will vote against

it,

and those

The apparently simple idea of economic well-being, however, can be defined in a
number of ways. Calculations of costs and benefits can operate at the personal, retrospective level and be defined as perceptions of past family

may

Or, they

economic

economic circumstances. 3

operate at the personal, prospective level as perceptions of future family
4

status.

society and be

Calculations of economic well-being also can focus on the larger

measured through

economic conditions. 5

citizen perceptions of national

Furthermore, a more narrow focus on tax consequences

is

conceivable; citizens

may

evaluate industrial-policy proposals differently, depending on whether they expect their
taxes to go

up or down. 6

Self-interested

tionalized in several ways.

We

models of vote choice,

shall see that the

in short,

can be opera-

measure chosen can have important

consequences for the results achieved.
In contrast to

economic models,

approaches assume that people bring more

political

to policy decisions than calculations about taxes or

economic

evaluations can be measured through a variety of indicators
tions, interest in politics, trust in

;

health.

These broader

ideology, party identifica-

government, and views of the representativeness of

governmental institutions are among the indicators various scholars have suggested.7 For
example,

if citizens

do not

trust

government

officials to

do what

is

"right," or if they

believe that leaders are corrupt, these attitudes should influence citizens' evaluations of

policy proposals. Or, to cite an example that
citizens' reactions to a

lieve that

A

is

relevant to the industrial-policy issue,

Greenhouse Compact might well depend on whether they be-

government has a responsibility

to create jobs for the

unemployed.

on election campaigns, emphasizes the
effect of contextual factors on vote choice. This is a less deterministic and more
contingent perspective, because citizens' underlying attitudes and beliefs are not
third

model, derived from the

literature

regarded as decisive. Instead, this model focuses on events that occur during an electoral

campaign and

them

to

that

have implications for underlying attitudes, often reshaping

cause unexpected changes in final voter decisions. Attitudes obviously are not
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irrelevant in this

framework, but their significance depends on how they interact with

events that unfold during the election campaign. To understand voter reactions to industrial-policy proposals

from

this perspective, therefore,

it

is

essential to explore the

relationships between voter perceptions and the events that define the context within

which the proposals are developed, debated, and decided.
Questions derived from both the economic and political perspectives were included
in

our questionnaire, as were standard demographic items. Meanwhile, the

utility

of

model was explored, using an analysis of voter decision making over
time and a documentary reconstruction of events. Let us now consider what each of
these models can tell us about the Rhode Island vote.
To begin with the economic and political explanations, table 1 reports Kendall Tau
the contextual

correlations between the

Greenhouse vote and several indicators derived from these

perspectives. 8 Several interesting conclusions
the standard

emerge from these

economic variables had weak relationships

regardless of whether perceptions of

figures. First,

to the vote.

most of

For example,

economic well-being are operationalized as per-

sonal or collective views, considered either retrospectively or prospectively, they were

not strongly linked to voting behavior. Perceptions of the

Rhode

Island

economy

last

Table 1

Between Greenhouse Vote
and Key Variables

Correlations

Correlation
Coefficients

Variable

Demographics
Gender

.01

.16*

Age

-.18*
-.12*
-.02

Education

Income
Unemployed
Union membership
Public employment

.11*

-.16*

Economic Weil-Being
Rhode Island economy last year
Rhode Island economy next year
Other state economies

-.02
-.12*
-.11*

Family last year
Family next year
Political

.

Attitudes

Party identification

.17*

Ideology

.1

in government
Government corruption

.22*

Trust

Personal Impact
Compact helps

me

.48*

get better job

Source: 1984 Greenhouse Survey, conducted by

The numbers reported here

*
1

-.20*

Compact raises my taxes
Commission represents me
Compact helps young stay in Rhode

Note:

14*

.06

Thomas

J.

*Probability value less than or equal to .05.
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.49*
.62*

Island

Anton and

are Kendall Tau coefficients

variables.

-.45*

Darrell

M. West.

between the Greenhouse vote and selected
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year had a barely visible correlation of —.02 with the vote. Perceptions of future per-

formance of the Rhode Island economy also showed a correlation of only
did views about either past or future family economic health do

imum,

therefore, the

on the

state

Greenhouse Compact did not appear

of the overall

least as conventionally

Rhode

Island

much

to have

economy or family

— .12.9 Nor

better.

At a min-

been a referendum

financial well-being, at

measured.

Second, demographic characteristics also were remarkably unimportant

in account-

Gender was virtually unrelated to voting choice (Tau = .01), while
age, education, and income all exhibited relationships that were quite modest. Even
more surprising is the lack of relationship between employment status and support for
the Compact. The main goal of the Compact, repeatedly emphasized in printed matter
ing for the vote.

and media messages, was the creation of
had suffered above-average

that

levels of

sixty

thousand new jobs, for a work force

unemployment. Yet among our respondents,

having been unemployed in the recent past had essentially nothing to do with the vote
cast (Tau

= —

Membership

.02).

in a

union was more important, but only

leaving the impression that neither general perceptions of the

experiences with jobs or unions had
plan. Public

even

employment, either

do with voter responses

to

at the state

individual

to a job-creation

or local level, did play a role (—.16), but

was not very high.

this figure

Third,

much

slightly,

economy nor

some of

overwhelmingly

the standard political variables

so.

were related

Ideology had the weakest effect

for liberals to have supported the

Compact. Party

Democrats were

relationship, indicating that

house Compact than were Republicans, but

to the vote, although not

indicating a slight tendency

identification (.17) exhibited a stronger

slightly
this

(.11),

more

likely to support the

Green-

magnitude was not especially impres-

The items we adopted from the University of Michigan "trust in government"
showed stronger relationships to the vote, ranging from .22 for the trust-in-government scale to —.20 for the government corruption scale. 10 While these are not
unusually powerful correlations, we regard them as important because they attempt to
measure linkages between citizens and leaders. Such linkages are bound to be espesive.

scale

cially important in referenda of this kind,

complicated

— issues

which present unfamiliar— and

to voters without providing

them with

in this case,

the normal electoral cues,

such as those provided by candidates or political parties.

Our

strongest results by far

came with

the last group of variables,

which we have

labeled "personal impact" factors. These variables examined economic and political

perceptions of the

Compact itself. We used two questions — impact of the Compact on
taxes— that were explicitly economic in nature and one ques-

the job market and on

tion—the degree to which the Greenhouse commission (called the Strategic Development Commission, or SDC) represented citizens— that was explicitly political. The
final question in this group
whether the Compact would help young people stay in
Rhode Island was more ambiguous in meaning, as we discuss below.
These personal-impact variables allow one to examine more precisely the relation-

—

—

ship between vote choice and perceptions of the
are instructive. 11
to the question

The

SDC

and the Compact, and the

results

correlation, for example, between the vote and citizen responses

"Do you

think that people like you were represented on the Green-

house Compact Commission?" was

.49,

and therefore underlies the crucial significance

of the representation issue in the ambiguous political circumstances of an economic

development referendum.
the

It

also

Compact because "people

makes clear that many Rhode Islanders voted
them" were not among the elites appointed

like

76

against
to the

commission. To voters confronted by a complicated plan

that

was prepared by an agency

consciously set apart from ordinary people, the most intelligible cue available appears
to have

been the representativeness of the commission

That perceptions were important to voters

is

made

itself.

clear not only by the representa-

and taxes. We examined percepthe
asking respondents whether the
employment
impact
and
tax
issue
by
tions of the
Compact would have improved their job prospects and whether it would have raised
their taxes. The strength of these relationships (Tau = .48 and -.45, respectively)
suggests the presence of a clear economic component in voter decisions. Virtually all
respondents (93 percent) thought the Compact would have increased their taxes, but
fewer than 20 percent thought they would have benefited personally in general had the
Compact been approved, and only 25 percent believed the Compact would have improved their chances of getting a better job. For Rhode Island voters, in short, the
Greenhouse Compact was viewed primarily not as the comprehensive economic development plan its promoters proclaimed, but simply as another large-scale spending
program for which they would have to pay but from which they would gain little
tion variable, but also by the items concerning jobs

benefit. If the typical

government-spending proposal seeks

can get something for nothing,

give voters nothing for something. 12

The obvious

to

persuade voters that they

one sought approval for a plan

this

And

appeared to

that

something was their tax dollars.

that

most

strength of this interpretation supports a similar view of the single

powerful correlation reported in table

between vote cast and

1,

voters'

views of the

Compact to help young people stay in Rhode Island. Public interest in
emerged early in the public debate over the Compact and became a prominent theme in the media campaign organized by Compact supporters. The relationship
between support for the Compact and a belief that it would keep young people in the
state was very strong in our sample (Tau = .62) which we interpret as the expectation
capacity of the

this issue

,

that the plan

would have helped create jobs

for youthful relatives of respondents.

entirely possible, of course, that respondents

answering

this question.

They may have thought,

have promoted economic well-being for the

young people

may have had

in the state.

Or

they

may have

for example, that the

state as a

whole, thus helping to keep

believed that the plan would have been

we were unable to resolve
we accept the pos-

socially useful in keeping families together. Unfortunately,
all

It is

mind when
Compact would

other views in

of the ambiguities arising from responses to this question; thus,

sible validity of differing interpretations.

These measures take us some distance toward understanding the structure of voter demaking on the Greenhouse Compact, but they remain no more than suggestive

cision

when expressed
ate

To extend the

as simple correlations.

analysis,

we developed

models, taking advantage of the information presented in table

1

to

multivari-

exclude the dem-

ographic and economic well-being measures that seemed unrelated to the vote, but including certain political variables that should, in theory, have been related to voter
choice, as well as the important personal-impact variables.

were used

to study these relationships: regression

fers the virtue of clarity. It allows us to

However, because regression

rests

surements and a "normal" distribution

statistical

approaches

analysis. 13 Regression of-

observe the strength as well as the direction of

relationships between variables and clarifies the relative
tions.

Two

and probit

power of

on various assumptions

alternative explana-

— such

as interval

mea-

— we also used probit analysis to confirm our re-

gression results. Although probit estimates lack the simple interpretations of regression
techniques, their utility in the analysis of categorical data

77

recommends

their use.
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Table 2 shows that regardless of the
similar.

Such

approach used, the results are quite

statistical

traditional political variables as ideological beliefs

and

political trust

show little explanatory power. The variables that clearly demonstrate explanatory
power in this analysis, as in the earlier correlation analysis, are those we have labeled
personal impact.

Among

the personal impact variables, though,

it

is

neither the tax increase nor the job betterment items contribute as

interesting that

much

to explaining

do the remaining two variables. This suggests that despite the overwhelming
expectation that taxes would have increased had the Compact passed, the tax issue was
not the most important source of the voting decision. The significance of citizens' misthe vote as

trust of the elite underlines the crucial

emerges both

in the

importance of the representation variable, which

regression and probit analysis as second only to the "helps young

people stay in Rhode Island" variable

in its

explanatory power. Since commissioners

were appointed rather than elected, normal sources of electoral accountability could
not be called into play in the event of public dissatisfaction with commission activities.

And

since the

members of

the

SDC

were drawn almost entirely from the well-edu-

cated, highly paid bureaucratic and technical elites
different

whose experiences were vastly
it clearly was easy to doubt

from those of the average Rhode Island worker,

that such individuals could be sensitive to the average citizen's interests in developing
strategies for spending tax dollars contributed by citizens. In the absence of formalized
political representation,

Rhode

who

representation: those

Island voters appear to have followed a theory of literal

me

are not like

cannot know, encourage, or protect

my

interests.

Table 2

Models of the Greenhouse Vote

Multivariate
Variable

Regression

Probit

Ideology

.026
.130*

.158
.235*

.001

.032

.087
.129

.243*
.183*

.984*
.643*

-.174*

-.946*

.402*

1.407*

Party identification
in government
Government corruption

Trust

Commission represents me

Compact
Compact
Compact
R

2

me get better
raises my taxes
helps

job

helps young people stay

in

Rhode

Island

.58

t

Source: 1984 Greenhouse Survey, conducted by

Thomas

J.

Anton and

Darrell

M. West.

The figures reported here are unstandardized regression coefficients. Coefficients marked with an
asterisk were at least twice the size of their standard errors, and thereby were significant at the .05 level.
Note:

tR 2 refers to the total explanatory power of the model.

model,

In this

it

explains 58 percent of the variance

in

the vote.
*Probability value less than or equal to .05.

We

are

now

in a position to better

understand the structure of the June 12 vote and

thus the politics of this effort at economic planning. To begin with, the vote was not a
reflection of citizens' beliefs about the state of the

Rhode

Island

economy or

the state

of family financial well-being, considered either retrospectively or prospectively. While
voters assuredly had such views,

we have shown

78

that those

views had

little to

do with

was not much affected by

the votes they cast in the referendum. In addition, the vote

Democrats were found on both sides of the
Democrats to react more favorably to the plan seems

partisan considerations. Republicans and

and the

issue,

slight

tendency for

far less significant than other factors.

The

make

data reviewed here

clear,

What, then, was the vote

we

about?

all

think, that the June 12 referendum

was pre-

eminently a vote based on calculations of personal impact, in a context that forced
voters to adopt a literal theory of representation

Almost

tive vote.

who

voters believed that the

all

believed that those taxes would help to

the representativeness of the

SDC

voted for

which

all

but guaranteed a large nega-

Compact would raise their taxes. A few
create new jobs and who did not object to
the Greenhouse plan. The great majority

of voters, however, thought that paying higher taxes would do

little

or nothing for them

or their relatives and would instead provide additional resources for the groups represented on the commission to squander on themselves. To the extent that the June 12
vote was a public-policy decision,

was a vote against higher

it

taxes.

To the extent

that

was a commentary on the political process, the vote was a thorough
repudiation of the elite that had developed and promoted the plan. To the extent that

the referendum

was a commentary on Rhode Island

the vote

politics in general,

it

was a massive

affir-

mation of the status quo.

The Dynamic Dimensions of Voter Decision Making

We

have treated the Greenhouse Compact referendum to this point as though

on June

single event that occurred

12,

Although technically

1984.

were a

it

true that the

it is

votes were cast on that day only, intense public debate over the merits of the plan

began

in

November

1983,

when

through the election. During
opportunities to

make up

made up

then followed for
activity

reached

percent)

their minds,

and they did so

many

at different times.

many
From a voter's

elections, not one.

A

large

group of voters

minds as soon as the plan was released; a decisional lull
several months as voters contemplated the debate; and decisional

its

made up

and continued unabated

public,

period of nearly eight months, voters had

point of view, therefore, there were
(27 percent)

was made

the plan

this

their

peak

in the

month preceding

their minds, including the

the vote,

when most

voters (55

26 percent who decided

in the last

week

alone. 14 This variation in the timing of voter choice suggests an extremely volatile
electorate

very

last

One

and

reflects

an uncertainty for

many people

that

was not resolved

until the

minute.

ideally

would prefer a panel survey

— in

which a sample of voters

reinter-

is

viewed several times during a campaign— to investigate campaign dynamics. But short
of that research design,

it is

possible to conduct a preliminary analysis of short-term

electoral forces using our question regarding time of decision. Table

on the next

3,

page, examines the differential impact of economic and political forces during the

campaign by breaking down our

made

their vote decision. 15

The

earlier regression

model by the time

results are interesting

at

which

citizens

because they show the varying

importance of economic and political variables in the model, depending on what was
going on during the campaign. For example, the tax variable contributed a good deal
to the explanation of voter decisions early in the

campaign but contributed

nothing a month before the vote and only a modest amount
party identification was important

among

at the

early, but not late, deciders.

The

representation factor, finally, was important throughout the campaign, but

79

virtually

very end. Similarly,
political
it

also

was

New England Journal
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the only variable that reached statistical significance during the critical period of one

two weeks before the election

to

which we outline below).

(for reasons

Table 3

Regression Model by Time of Decision on Greenhouse Vote

Variable

Last

1-2

Week

Weeks

-.00018
-.00098

Ideology

government

Party identification

.00003

Government corruption
Commission represents me
Compact helps young people
stay in Rhode Island

.016
.253*

.291*

in

1-3

3+

Months

Months

.046

-.043

-.108

.041

-.051
.043
.069
.093
.310*

Trust

2-4
Weeks

.020
.082
.040*

-.0010

.291*

.051*
.017
.257*

.106

.199*

.135*

.147*

.231*
.016

-.237*

-.145*

.73

.75

.077*

-.037

.307*

Compact helps me get
.059

.011

-.104

-.121

.43

.56

better job

Compact

raises

my

taxes

R2 t

Source: 1984 Greenhouse Survey, conducted by

Thomas

J.

.71

Anton and

Darrell

.093*

.069

M. West.

The figures reported here are unstandardized regression coefficients. Coefficients marked with an
asterisk were at least twice the size of their standard errors, and thereby were significant at the .05 level.
Note:

tR 2 refers to the total explanatory power of the model; the .43 in the "Last Week" column, for example,
that the model explains 43 percent of the variance in the vote for those who made up their minds
during the last week of the campaign.

means

*Probability value less than or equal to .05.

There are two reasons related

to

campaign dynamics which seem

to

account for the

varying effects of economic self-interest and political representation: short-term
political

developments and the composition of the electorate

at

each decision point.

Short-term electoral forces were an important part of the decisional calculation by

Although the

voters.

SDC

had successfully brought

on

insisted that

all

nonpolitical plan, in fact

its

blacks

—

felt left

its

activities

were "above politics" and

that

it

major sectors of the Rhode Island economy into agreement

many sectors— such

as small business,

women, and

out and were determined to appeal to the political process. There thus

was no way the commission could avoid the

political arena.

Though enabling

legisla-

few

tion for the referendum

had passed both chambers of the

legislators felt strongly

committed. Most were negative toward the legislation but voted

state legislature easily,

make a choice that the legislators were reluctant
The House Speaker and Senate majority leader were instrumental
in securing this outcome and, in return, achieved commission agreement that they
would each appoint three of the members of the new commission— if the referendum

for
to

it

because

make

it

allowed the public to

themselves.

passed.
In late May, slightly

more than two weeks before

the referendum, both the Speaker

to the new
The Republican candidate for governor immediately announced his outrage
over the absence of Republicans among these appointments by Democratic leaders and
warned that his earlier support for the Compact had been shaken. After several days of

and the majority leader announced

that they

planned to appoint themselves

agency.

well-publicized bickering between Republican and Democratic partisans, a solution of
sorts

was reached. The commission membership would be expanded by two

in order to

allow the Republican minority leadership in each house to appoint one commission

80

member. This agreement, announced

just nine days before the vote,

seemed

to

many

to

be a solution worse than the original problem, since the new agency would become even
less, political in composition. Whatever the status of the old Strategic
Development Commission had been, the new agency clearly would be viewed as a pre-

more, rather than
dominantly
It is

political group.

not difficult in retrospect to understand

why

voters

who made

their decisions

during the one to two weeks before the election were so overwhelmingly opposed to the

A

Compact.

image of the

commission

sion that had believed

A

commission

its

its experience and expertise had offered an
was contradicted by growing employment. A commis-

had ballyhooed

that

economy

state's

that

efforts to

be above

politics

had become enmeshed

in politics.

had promised objective decisions had delivered appointments

that

that

who were
citizen. And if

hinted strongly of back-room deals, cut in the old-fashioned ways by people

obviously unlikely to have

much concern

for the interests of the average

was so much controversy and deal making now, how could voters expect that future activities of a new commission would be any different? Virtually everything about
the events of late May and early June strongly suggested the emergence of an "old polthere

seemed antithetical to the new policies called
Campaign dynamics, therefore, were instrumental

Greenhouse

itics" that

for in the original

plan.

in bringing the political repre-

weeks

sentation factor to the forefront in the

impact of economic

just before the election

and

in limiting the

self-interest.

In addition, the role of

economic and

political forces during the

campaign

shifted,

because different types of voters made up their minds during various stages of the campaign. Table 4,

who made up
who made up

on the next page, offers a brief profile of three groups of voters: those
minds early (three months or more prior to the referendum), those

their
their

minds

second week before the vote, and those

in the

their decisions during the last

week of

chosen not simply because of the demographic and
the table, but also because they

who made

the campaign. These three electorates were

made very

attitudinal differences portrayed in

different decisions. Bearing in

mind

that

our sample of respondents slightly overrepresented Compact supporters, the percentages of voters in these groups
respectively.

More

virtually all of those

dum

turned against

who opposed

the

Compact were

76.0, 88.5,

who made up

it,

margin of support

volatility

65.5,

their

minds

in the

second week before the referen-

as support for the plan all but disappeared. This precipitous

drop was followed, however, by a recovery of support that produced
largest

and

than three-quarters of the early deciders opposed the Compact, but

Compact of any week

for the

in the

in

our sample the

campaign. Both voter

and powerful influences on voter choices are clearly documented by these

figures.

Reading down the columns of table 4 offers some insight into the forces
early deciders

likely than voters in either of the other

two categories

to declare

cans; were largely opposed to government intervention in the
ticeably

more

at play.

The

were dominated by middle-aged, upper-income individuals; were more
themselves Republi-

economy; and were no-

cynical about government honesty and effectiveness. Since they were also

most of their information from the Providence Journal-Bulletin, it
seems appropriate to characterize these early deciders as informed ideologues of prereaders, gaining

dominantly moderate-to-conservative
sharply with the group that

came

dum. This

was

"late electorate"

about government, and

political opinions.

to a decision in the

Their profile contrasts most

second week before the referen-

older, less prosperous, less well educated, less cynical

much more Democratic
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than the early deciders. They were also

New England Journal

much more
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likely to

be "watchers" and "listeners" than readers, with both television

main source of information about the
prominence of Democratic
view this grouping as largely made up of the

and radio approaching the newspaper as

Compact. Given
party adherence,

their

their ideological conservatism as well as the
it

seems plausible

conservative Democrats

who

to

often are found in working-class communities.

Table 4

Three Electorates, Three Elections: Characteristics by Time of Choice
Time

of Decision Prior to

(numbers
Variable

Referendum

%)

Three Months or More

1-2 Weeks

% 65+

Last

Week

19.4

26.9

23.6

College-educated

49.6

37.9

50.0

Income $35,000+

28.2*

18.2

19.5*

Democrat

24.4*

38.3

35.7*

Republican

14.8*

8.3

9.0*

Age:

%
%

in

Party Identification

Ideology
Liberal

12.3*

3.4*

8.5*

Conservative

21.0*

27.1*

16.2*

18.8*

24.2

28.7*

18.2*

28.6

30.7*

53.1

63.2

45.4*
40.0*

32.1

Government should create jobs
Trust

in

government

News Source

TV

72.3
37.9*

Radio

32.5*

Providence Journal-Bulletin

Source: 1984 Greenhouse Survey, conducted by

*Categories

whose

Thomas

J.

differences were significant at the .05

Anton and

Darrell

21.9

M. West.

level.

The "last minute" electorate, whose members finally made up their minds during
week before the vote, differed from the early and late deciders in several important
respects. Somewhat older and considerably less prosperous than the early ideologues,
they were more liberal and far better educated, and very nearly as Democratic in their
party allegiances, as citizens who had made their decisions a week earlier. They were
also less cynical about government than either of the other electorates, and were more
the

willing to accept the legitimacy of government job-creation programs. Since the last-

minute deciders were more likely
are inclined to think of

them

views, often associated with the

their

at

be readers than either watchers or

more

These different electorates and

dynamics

to

after the

we

liberal

elements of the Democratic party.

their varied preferences offer insight into the electoral

play in the Greenhouse referendum.

minds shortly

listeners,

as informed ideologues of moderate-to-liberal political

Compact was made

A

fairly large bloc of voters

made up

public, grounding their choices in the

predominantly conservative ideologies associated with well-educated, upper-income
people.

As enabling

legislation for the

legislature, a small but steady

referendum was introduced and debated

weeks of winter and early spring; but not
large bloc of voters

come

in the

stream of voters came to their decisions through the
until

to their conclusions,
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two weeks before the vote did another
which were more overwhelmingly

negative than at any other time during the campaign. This late electorate seems some-

what paradoxical, since

it

was

far

more Democratic than Republican

(38.3 to 8.3 per-

government action than the early deciders, yet

it was far
Compact. The move toward a less cynical, more
supportive electorate culminated in the last week of the campaign, when another large
bloc of voters made more positive choices than had been made in any other time peri-

cent) and far less cynical about

and away the

od.

It

voters

least supportive of the

appears, then, that the largely negative early electorate

who had some

difficulty

making up

their

minds

until

was followed by groups of

two weeks before the

vote,

when the electorate turned almost wholly negative. The recovery of support in the final
week was substantial, but not nearly enough so to create an electorate that came anywhere close
In

to majority support for the

summary, economic and

Compact.

political factors played varying roles as the

Greenhouse

campaign unfolded. Yet these variations were not random fluctuations; they instead
appear to have been related to short-term dynamics within the campaign. When tax
talk was dominating the debate, economic factors played a major role in voter decision
making; when representational issues were paramount,
forefront.

It

political factors rose to the

thus seems clear that economic and political forces both were important

during the Greenhouse debate but that their relative importance varied, depending on
short-term campaign dynamics.

Conclusions

We

began

this exploration as a test of

issue in explaining the failure of the

Magaziner's belief that trust was the dominant

Greenhouse Compact

to

win popular support.

can now conclude that Magaziner was only partially correct. Although trust was

deed an important factor
tant, particularly

in the

Greenhouse

vote, other factors

We

in-

were even more impor-

perceptions of personal impact of the plan and concern over repre-

The clear significance of such factors seems sufficiently interesting to warcommentary on issues raised in the Greenhouse Compact debate which are
important not only for Rhode Island but for the nation as a whole.
It is clear, to begin with, that the decisive rejection of the Greenhouse Compact by
Rhode Island voters was not a product of deep-seated (and therefore unalterable) economic or political attitudes. As seems true in other states, Rhode Island voters generally supported government efforts to stimulate economic growth and did not reject the
Compact as an unwarranted intrusion of government into the private sector. Nor did
they oppose the plan because of a general mistrust in government (which was high),
party identification, or some other stable quality of public opinion. Rather, their opposition was founded almost entirely on perceptions of the plan itself. Most voters believed that the Compact would raise their taxes but provide little or no benefit to them
in return. The firmness of this belief, in turn, was based on their thoroughgoing missentation.

rant a final

trust of the financial

and

political elite that

had formulated the plan, with no perceived

representation of the average citizen's interests, through processes that strongly suggest-

ed

political deals that

were designed

to further enrich that tiny elite.

These were

short-

term perceptions associated with a specific proposal from a specific group which easily
could have been different

if

the plan had been presented and

If these data thus affirm the

promoted

differently.

experience of other states that have held successful

referenda, they also suggest the risks inherent in pursuing a "sectoral" approach.

A

planning group chosen to represent economic sectors rather than political constituen-

83

New England

Journal of Public Policy

cies runs the risk of being cut off

ment Commission
est

among
major

worked hard

may

worked hard

commission's plan, no candidate

for the plan,

a halfhearted supporter at the end.

some

leaflets in their

and even the governor seemed

Borrowing from a European

corporatist model, several institutions pursued their

and insurance companies inserted

Strategic Develop-

some of the best and brightbut when push came to shove, no one in the
well have included

to mobilize support for the

state or local office

more than

little

from those constituencies. The

Island

the state's institutional elite,

legislature

for

Rhode

in

own

mobilization efforts: banks

monthly statements encouraging

some businesses
we have no data
on voter reactions to such efforts, suspicion of the commission elite had become so
powerful by the time of the referendum that these efforts probably did no more than
increase voter resentment of the plan and its sponsors. In American politics, operating
citizens to vote;

colleges and universities did the same; and

inserted similar leaflets in their

monthly

bills to

customers. Although

outside the established political institutional structure can be a two-edged sword.

The

risks inherent in a sectoral strategy are

economic planning

SDC
to a

was obliged

magnified

if

public participation in

sought. Having insisted on a public referendum on

is

to give

mass audience. But

some consideration

its

to

how

its

plan, the

the plan might best be presented

treatment of this issue must be regarded as inadequate at

from across the country as well as in Rhode
commission proposed a tax increase to partially fund the Compact. And to
make matters worse, it suggested programs so complicated that virtually no one could

best.

Defying recent

political experience

Island, the

understand them. The twin effects were to give opponents an easily understood negative label to pin

on the program— that

this

was a tax increase

— while

denying to

proponents any opportunity to defend the Compact in terms that could be understood.

From the beginning, therefore, the commission lost control over the most fundamental
component of an electoral campaign, namely, definition of the issue. The commission
announced a plan to create jobs or stimulate economic growth, but voters heard a plan
to increase taxes. And, as we have shown, a substantial number of voters made up
their minds as soon as they heard that message. Although the tax increase was later
eliminated by the legislature, the image remained attached to the Compact and contributed to

its

Unable
paign.

defeat.
to define the issue, the

Under normal

commission

electoral conditions,

lost control of the

when

dynamics of the cam-

candidates are competing for an of-

campaign and then pursue the
Development Commission very nearly
reversed this process, producing a core group of opponents early in the campaign and
failing to establish a base of support until the very last minute. As our analysis of the
three electorates has shown, the voters who disproportionately comprised the lastfice, the

goal

is

to secure core supporters early in the

undecided voters. The

efforts of the Strategic

minute deciders were those
that those efforts could

who

supported government job-creation efforts; believed

be effective; were less likely to believe that the government

wasted taxes or was corrupt; were more trusting of government; and were less likely to
think that the government represented only big interests. These individuals were the

Greenhouse Compact, yet their doubts or confusion prevented
them from joining the Greenhouse coalition early in the campaign. In effect, there
never was a core group of voter supporters for the Compact.
These dynamics were important because, unlike candidate elections, referenda are
"low information" contests, in which voters generally know little about the issues on
natural base for the

the ballot and often have difficulty evaluating the proposals. If traditional political
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elites (that is, elected officeholders)

and traditional

political factors (partisanship

and

ideology) do not emerge to provide much-needed cues for citizens, short-term voter

perceptions of the plan and the way in which the campaign

is conducted will dominate
from the governor, whose support visibly weakened as the campaign wore on, no statewide officeholder emerged to champion the plan. Party labels

the election. Apart

could not easily be attached to the proposal, since neither party took a formal position

on the Compact itself. Most of the commissioners were not in public life, and those
who were deliberately refrained from partisan appeals. Absent these typical clues to
interpret commission motives, voters gradually concluded that the commission represented nothing more than the interests of the financial and corporate elite that had
formulated the plan.

Although concern over the representation issue was expressed repeatedly
commission,

it is

clear that

its

members never understood how

to the

significant that concern

more women or blacks or neighborhood or regional representatives
new agency were often dismissed by citing
the impossibility of representing every interest on a public agency. When, in late May,
the governor used his appointments to reappoint members of the existing commission
and the legislative leaders appointed themselves to the new commission, it was easy for
was. Proposals that

or small businessmen be appointed to the

voters to conclude that the planning

group either had not heard the expressions of

concern or had rejected them. The commission,

was perceived

in short,

insensitive or hostile to the interests of the average person,

changed membership, could be expected
future.

Unattached

to

bolically attached to a

own

be either

to

and with essentially un-

be equally hostile or insensitive

to

in the

accountable political institutions and unwilling to become sym-

more broadly defined

public, the

commission

fell

victim to

its

elitism.

How

are these remarkable strategic choices to be explained?

How

could a group of

experienced and sensible individuals seek to gain public approval by proposing to
increase taxes in order to spend a great deal of
easily explained,

composed
Caught up
it

that

is

that the

in the pressure

money

SDC

that could not

be

and a few politicians? One answer,

simply didn't pay

much

attention to political strategy.

and excitement of developing an imaginative

simply overlooked the political dimensions of

the belief (or hope) that a

programs

for

were to be administered by a tiny, nonelective body

largely of bankers, big businessmen,

surely plausible,

posals,

programs

good plan would

admitted as much, and their surprise

sell itself.

at the political

its

set of pro-

mission, perhaps because of

Commission members have

uproar caused by appointments to

new commission also suggests a certain lack of political sensitivity. However plauit may seem, though, inattention to political strategy is ultimately unsatisfying as
an explanation, since inattention must itself be explained. How, then, can we account
for the failure of the SDC to be more attentive to its own political requirements?
One important answer, we think, lies in the political residue that formed part of the

the

sible

context in which the commission worked and that obviously influenced

Rhode
it

its

proposals.

Island has had a long history of bitter labor-management relations; even today,

holds the unenviable record of the longest continuous strike against a manufacturer

in recent U.S. history. Strikers' benefits

were a powerful symbol of

this intransigent

mood, causing employers to be angry over the use of their contributions to prolong
work stoppages; providing workers with an imagined protection against being pushed
around by employers; and causing a large segment of the
over a state image as a "bad place to do business."
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state's elite to feel

Members

of the

SDC

concern

shared this

New England Journal

of Public Policy

concern and sought

document

to craft a

that

investors in the rest of the country that a

and

that the

could combat

this

Greenhouse Compact would provide evidence of

For a small

state to

make

Rhode

in

big idea was necessary; hence the comprehensiveness of the

that change.

tag.

Compact, the voluminous

Indeed, early promotional material

Compact suggested (without any obvious foundation)

that

two dollars of private

investment would be generated by every public dollar spent, producing a

ment

to

Island

a significant impact on the national business community, a

documentation, and the very expensive price
for the

image by announcing

major change had occurred

total invest-

economic growth of $750 million, rather than only $250 million. In a real
sense, therefore, the problem to which the Compact was addressed was not so much
economic growth but a perceived national image, and the audience to which the Comfor

pact was addressed was not

Rhode

Island at

all,

but the national business

reaching out for national impact, the commission apparently neglected

its

elite.

In

Rhode

Island

base.

Offering a plan aimed

been

difficult

even

at a national

the

if all

members

audience to a Rhode Island electorate would have
of the commission had been extremely attentive

because the size and scope of the plan appeared to violate

to local politics, if only

widely accepted norms of the appropriate scale of any form of political action. Rhode
Island

a small place, dominated by

is

what Elmer Cornwell and Jay Goodman have

described as a "politics of intimacy," in which politicians are expected to develop a
first-name familiarity with their constituents. 16 Citizens, in turn, take an obvious pride
in

using

first

names when addressing U.S.

senators,

congressmen and congresswomen,

governors, and other public officials. In this intimate context, the Greenhouse
pact, developed by technocrats
institutions, staffed

from national business organizations and

Com-

financial

by a consulting firm with an international clientele, seemed out of

scale and out of place, reflecting values wholly out of touch with the personalized

localism of the

state's residents.

Among

the voters

more

we

interviewed, the longer the

length of residence in

Rhode

Compact. Legislators

reflected these sentiments against the size of the plan

reduced

its

or not the

Island, the

likely

it

From

scope several months before the election.

Compact was

a

good plan was

irrelevant.

was

It

that citizens

opposed the

when

this point of view,

they

whether

was simply the wrong plan

for

an electorate accustomed to less grandiose and more personalized presentations.
Popular preferences for smaller and more personalized policies in Rhode Island are
not necessarily different from popular preferences in other states. Economic-develop-

ment proposals offered

to voters elsewhere have

been

far less

comprehensive and

less

expensive than the Greenhouse Compact, and they have been included on ballots that
offered other issues for citizens to consider.

Modest

in size

and related

to other policy

questions, such proposals are easily perceived as incremental rather than radical ad-

The Greenhouse Compact, however, was a "big" plan that promised a
state's economy through the infusion of thousands of new
high-tech jobs. Moreover, the Compact stood alone, isolated from other policy matters

justments.

thorough overhaul of the

referendum that exaggerated its costs and aspiwas both too big and too radical, alienating even potential beneficiaries, such as workers who feared they would not quality for the new jobs.
What Rhode Island voters may have demonstrated, therefore, was not so much opposi-

and most

state politicians in a separate

rations. In this sense, the plan

tion to

economic planning

states,

Rhode

as discomfort with radical change. Like voters in other

Islanders reaffirmed the classic

rather than comprehensive policymaking. **>
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American preference

for incremental
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